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1 Whistleblowing,  which  emerged  under  the  influence  of  US  laws  and  international
agreements, is a new concept for european countries. France was initially reluctant to
establish effective whistleblower protections. Then, in recognition of its international
commitments and in response to various political and financial scandals (Kerviel Affair,
Cahuzac Affair), France adopted comprehensive reforms of public and economic life by
laws passed from 2007 to 2016 (I).  As such, beyond adopting the legislative changes
called for in a number of european and international conventions, several measures
should be considered to improve the legislation on whistleblowing in France, especially
in the fight against national and transnational corruption (II).
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I- Whistleblowing and the implementation in France of
international and european conventions on combating
corruption
A. The evaluation of the implementation in France of the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions
2 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which came into force in France on 29 September
20001, criminalizes  bribery  of  foreign  public  officials  in  international  business
transactions.  The  OECD Working  Group on Bribery  is  charged  with  monitoring  the
implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention  in  member
states.  From  2000  to  2014,  the  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery  evaluated  the
implementation in France of the OECD Convention and the 2009 Recommendation of
the Council on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions.
 
1. Reporting of suspected transnational bribery by whistleblowers in the private
sector.
3 In  the  private  sector,  french  law  established  in  2007  a  special  protection  for
whistleblowers who report acts of corruption. The Act of 2007 created Article 1161-1 of
French Labor Code, which provides that:
4 “No employee may be punished, dismissed or subjected to any discriminatory measure, whether
direct or indirect, in particular with respect to remuneration, training, transfer, assignments,
qualifications, classification, professional promotion, or amendment or renewal of contract for
having  reported  or  disclosed  in  good  faith,  either  to  his/her  employer  or  to  the  judicial  or
administrative authorities, acts of corruption of which he/she becomes aware in the exercise of
his/her functions”.2
5 In case of  conflict  between an employer and an employee,  article  1161-1 of  French
Labor Code shifts the burden of proof: the employer must demonstrate before a judge
that any adverse action taken against the employee has no relationship to that person's
disclosures.
6 In 2012, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted in Phase 3 that:
7 -  “whistleblowers  in  the private  sector  were subject  to  various obligations  of  discretion and
precaution which, in practice, tended to block reporting”.3
8 It recommended that:
9 -“  France  considers  introducing  stronger  protective  measures  for  employees  who  report
suspected bribery in order to encourage these employees to report without fear of retaliation in
the form of dismissals (Recommendation 5),4noting that:
10 -  “The  2009  Recommendation  calls  on  parties  to  the  Convention  to  ensure  that  appropriate
measures are in place to protect from discriminatory or disciplinary action public and private
sector  employees  who  report,  in  good  faith  and  on  reasonable  grounds,  to  the  competent
authorities, suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials (Recommendation IX (iii)”.5
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11 The Act of 2007 was strengthened in 2013 by new provisions protecting whistleblowers
reporting any crime or misdemeanor. The new law created Article L.1132-3-3 in the
Labor Code,  which protects an employee from any sanctions for making good faith
allegations  of  criminal  activities  witnessed  in  the  exercise  of  his  job  duties.  This
whistleblowing provision covers revelations made to the press, in addition to reports
made to administrative and judicial authorities. Moreover, whistleblower protections
are extended both to private and public-sector employees.6
12 In some cases, whistleblowers should offer considerable help to investigators trying to
identify  and  understand  complex  systems  of  fraud.  The  Law  of  December  6,  2013
expands the notion of self-reporting for certain corruption and influence trafficking
offenses  and  allows  for  a  reduction  in  punishment  as  a  reward  for  reporting  such
offenses to authorities.
 
2. Reporting of suspected transnational bribery by whistleblowers in the public
sector
13 Article 40, paragraph 1 of the french Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) provides that:
14 - “The district prosecutor receives complaints and denunciations and decides how to deal with
them, in accordance with the provisions of Article 40-1”.7
15 Article 40-1 of the CPP provides that:
16 - “Where he considers that facts brought to his attention in accordance with the provisions of
Article 40 constitute an offence committed by a person whose identity and domicile are known,
and for which there is no legal provision blocking the implementation of a public prosecution,
the  district  prosecutor  with  territorial  jurisdiction  decides  if  it  is  appropriate:  to  initiate  a
prosecution; or to implement alternative proceedings to a prosecution, in accordance with the
provisions of articles 41-1 or 41-2; or to close the case without taking any further action, where
the particular circumstances linked to the commission of the offence justify this”.8
17 Article 40, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP), provides that:
18 - “Any constituted authority, any public official or civil servant who, in the performance of his/
her  duties,  becomes  aware  of  a  crime  or  misdemeanor  must  report  it  without  delay  to  the
General Prosecutor and must provide all relevant information, minutes and documents relating
to the report”.9
19 In 2012, the OECD Working Group on Bribery remarked in Phase 3 that:
20 - “Application of this obligation appeared in practice to be weak or non-existent, as there was no
visible sanction (apart from rarely applied disciplinary penalties) for non-compliance with this
obligation”;10
21 -  “In  reality,  application  of  the  CPP  provisions  seems  limited  if  not  non-existent  in  certain
exposed sectors, such as foreign affairs, defence, development assistance and export credits, even
though some of these administrations were aware of cases of bribery, alleged or proven, in the
exercise of their mission”.11
22 According to representatives of  French public  agencies,  under-reporting of  corruption
was due to the risk of countercharges of slanderous reporting.12
23 But, the OECD Working Group on Bribery considered that:
24 - “This reflects a misunderstanding of the provisions of article 226-10 CP concerning defamation,
according to which the intentional element of the offence lies not in the falsity of the allegation
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itself, but in the knowledge, on the day the allegation was made, that it was false. A report made
in good faith pursuant to article 40 does not, then, fall within the scope of the law, as confirmed
by the Court of Cassation (Cass. Crim., 14 December 2000, appeal no 86595)”.13
25 French  representatives  also  mentioned  as  sources  of  difficulties  that  the  Public
Prosecutor’s Office had a policy not to open proceedings in the absence of sufficient
evidence,  and that  the law did not clearly specify what was to be understood by “
knowledge  of  an  offence”.  According to  these  representatives,  this  could explain why
some public officials believed that this provision required public-sector employees and
officials to report only proven acts of bribery.
26 These  arguments  didn’t  convince  the  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery,  which
responded that:
27 - “The law however gives the judicial authority the exclusive power to determine the existence of
an offence”.14
28 -“The biggest obstacle, however, (was) undoubtedly the tendency of public administrations to
exercise broad powers of discretion in deciding whether to report to the judicial authorities facts
brought to their attention - a tendency that apparently (had) its origin in the decision of the
Court of Cassation cited above which, without relieving the agent of his/her personal obligation,
(recognized) that the agent (was) part of  a hierarchical organization,  and that therefore the
communication of  criminal  acts  (could)  be done not  only by the official  who discovered the
offence but also by his/her superior”.15
29 - “During the review of the OECD in Phase 3, situations were confirmed where the administration
had not reported matters to the prosecution, specifically within agencies responsible for official
assistance….Jurisprudence,  however,  does not imply any transfer of responsibility that would
give the hierarchical authority a power it does not have, i.e. to assess the appropriateness of the
disclosure, as this is the prerogative of the criminal justice system. By proceeding in this way,
there is a real risk that the law enforcement authorities will be deprived of important sources of
detection”.16
30 Finally,” Considering that this obligation (article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP) constitutes one of
the keystones for the effectiveness of the criminal justice response to bribery in its international
dimension”17, the OECD Working Group recommended that:
31 - “France takes appropriate measures to encourage reporting under article 40 CPP, by means of
protocols  for  reporting  bribery  offences  between the  government  sectors  concerned and law
enforcement  authorities,  protocols  that  should  be  accompanied  by  a  clarification  of  the
provisions of section 2 of article 40 CPP, and ongoing training for officials “.18
32 - “France should regularly remind public officials of their obligation under the Code of Criminal
procedure  (CPP)  as  well  as  the  disciplinary  sanctions  incurred  in  case  of  non-compliance
(Recommendations 2 and 3)”.19
33 - “In the case of the personnel of the agencies responsible for development assistance (AFD) and
export credits (COFACE), procedures should be established for alerting the Public Prosecutor’s
Office to credible evidence of bribery of foreign public officials (Recommendation 4)”.20
34 In 2013, new actions were taken in France to implement the recommendations of the
OECD dealing with the reporting of  evidence of  national  and transnational  bribery.
Several significant reforms were passed in french law, including granting protection to
all whistleblowers in the public and private sectors (2013), creating a National Financial
Prosecutor  (2013),  ending  individual  instructions  from  the  Minister  of  Justice  to
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prosecutors (2013), and granting anti-corruption organizations the right to bring civil
party claims (2013).21
35 In 2014, despite these important measures, the OECD Working Group considered that
France was still not in compliance with the Anti-Bribery Convention, because it had not
implemented a significant number of the OECD’s recommendations made in Phase 3.
36 For instance, the OECD Working Group pointed out that:
37 -  “No warning and reporting mechanism (had) been put in place in government agencies to
enable comprehensive enforcement of the provisions of Article 40, paragraph 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The interpretation of the modalities to report allegations of bribery, which
(had) already been raised during Phase 3, (was) still an outstanding issue (Recommendations
11(b) and 11(c))”.22
38 Then, the OECD Working Group on Bribery asked France to intensify its actions to fight
bribery of foreign public officials.
 
B. The implementation of european legislation on the fight against
corruption
39 The Council of Europe has developed legal instruments dealing with criminalization of
corruption in the public and private sectors, the conduct of public officials, and liability
and compensation for damage caused by corruption. These instruments aim to improve
the capacity of European states to fight corruption at the domestic and international
levels23.  The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) is charged with monitoring
member  states’  compliance  with  the  Council  of  Europe’s  anti-corruption standards.
GRECO launched four evaluation rounds dealing with specific provisions of the Twenty
Guiding Principles and associated provisions of the Criminal Law Convention.24
40 France - as member of the Council of Europe since 5 May 1949 - was examined in the
fourth evaluation rounds.
41 In September 2001, GRECO recommended in the first evaluation report on France that:
42 - “France reminds government departments and all other public agencies of the existence and
content of Article 40, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and takes steps to facilitate
its use without hindrance in corruption cases”.25
43 In the following compliance report adopted in October 2003, French authorities stated
that:
44 -“ (i) Several initiatives had been taken at national level to draw attention to the importance of
the duty to report crime stipulated in Article 40 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to its
implementing requirements, particularly the fact that the official superior’s consent needed not
be obtained”.26
45 -  “(ii)  Under  partnership  policies  developed  at  local  level  with  decentralized  tiers  of  State
authorities (customs, taxation and Directorate for Fair Trade, Consumer Affairs and Suppression
of  Fraud,  in  particular),  public  prosecution  authorities  were  organizing  regular  meetings
bringing together representatives of the departments concerned and members of the judicial
service in order to impress upon them the machinery and implementing conditions of Article 40
(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure”.27
46 GRECO concluded that its recommendation had been satisfactorily implemented.
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47 Subsequent evaluation and compliance reports  on France adopted by GRECO in the
second,  third  and  fourth  evaluation  rounds  contained  no  developments  where  the
effective application of Article 40, paragraph 2 of CPP was concerned.28
 
II- French reforms to improve the fight against bribery
and the implementation of whistleblowing in french
law
48 In  2015,  the  Conseil  d’état  was  asked  by  French  government  to  review  French
legislation on whistleblowing and to make amendments.29
49 In  its  report  published  in  March  201630,  the  Conseil  d’état  examined  provisions  of
Article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP and explained that if civils servants, as custodians of
public interest, were charged with the duty to alert the judicial authority on serious
violations of French law (“Crimes” and “délits”), this obligation should be distinguished
from the right to blow the whistle which covers the situation of a person who decides
in conscience to alert his/her employer/ any public or judicial body/ the Media on
breaches of Law or serious concerns of public interest.
50 The Conseil d’état did not answer to the question of whether that provision should be
coupled with a penalty,  essentially for two reasons:  according to the Conseil  d’état,
whistleblowing should remain a right and article 40, paragraph 2 of CPP, which is a
duty for civil servants, is not a mechanism of whistleblowing; in any case, alternative
solutions such as monitoring or compliance programs should be preferred to penalties.
51 Following the report of the Conseil d’état, a new bill known as Sapin 2 on the fight
against  corruption  and  transparency  in  french  economic  life  was  adopted  by
government in march 2016. It should be adopted and come into force before the end of
2016.31
52 Beyond implementing a number of European Union directives into French Law, “Sapin
2”  introduces  legal  protection  for  whistleblowers  who  report  corruption-related
matters, prohibiting acts of retaliation against them and providing for the possibility of
payment of their legal costs.
53 Transparency International nonetheless remarked that:
54 - “The current draft creates several pre-conditions for any protection, including the proof that
the whistleblower is motivated by public interest and that there is no intention of obtaining any
personal advantage”.32
55 This seems to exclude the possibility for whistleblowers to receive a monetary reward
for their disclosures.33
56 In the public  sector,  law n°2016-483 of  20 April  2016 regarding the deontology and
rights and obligations of civil servants was published on 21 April 2016. The law includes
several provisions, such as legal protection for civil servants who blow the whistle on
conflicts of interests in the administration.34
57 As with the report of the Conseil d’état, “Sapin 2” - like the act of 6 December 2013 on
the fight against tax evasion and large-scale economic and financial crime and the law
n°2016-483 of 20 April 2016 regarding the deontology and the rights and obligations of
civil  servants  -  also  remains  silent  on  the  procedure  for  implementing  Article  40,
paragraph 2 of the CPP, especially on the question of whether that provision should be
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coupled with a penalty, in spite of previous propositions of reforms made in this way by
some members of Parliament.35
58 Similarly, the introduction in the act of 6 December 2013 and in the Act of 13 July 1983
of a general system of legal protection for public-sector employees who report, in good
faith, an offence or a crime or a conflict of interest of which he or she has obtained
knowledge in the exercise of his or her functions, should also encourage the reporting
of the facts of this nature to the Public Prosecutor’s office, on the basis of Article 40,
paragraph 2 of the CPP.36
59 However,  the  observation  made  by  legal  practitioners  on  the  weak  application  of
Article L.1161-1 of the Employment Code, which protects private-sector employees who
blow the whistle on corruption matters, shows that while this provision has the merit
to exist, it is unfortunately ineffective.
60 Legal protection of public officials  who blow the whistle during the course of their
duties on corruption matters, which is an important reform, is not sufficient to ensure
the application of Article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP. Reform of the provisions of Article
40, paragraph 2 of the CPP is called for.
61 Legislator should work to build a coherent and efficient system for the reporting of
criminal acts to the public prosecutor’s office. Clearly, the text of Article 40, paragraph
2  of  the  CPP,  as  drafted  and  applied  today,  no  longer  meets  France’s  needs or  its
international commitments.
62 The text should be overhauled in order to provide a coherent and efficient mechanism
for reporting that protects the rights of French citizens.
63 The scope of the article and the conditions for its implementation need to be clarified,
and the question of whether that provision should be coupled with a penalty needs to
be discussed.
64 The question of whether the reporting obligation under Article 40, paragraph 2 CPP in
the public sector should be coupled - or not - with a penalty is a very delicate one and
requires a change in legislation.
65 The Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption (SCPC) noted in its reports that one
solution might be to extend the crime of failure to report crimes37 to the non-reporting
of civil offences, thereby including probity abuses.38
66 It  must  be  noted  that  this  would  give  the  nature  of  a  punishable  obligation  to
whistleblowing but would likely generate a flow of cases to the Public prosecutors that
they  would  have  difficulty  managing  with  their  current,  limited  resources.  Some
practitioners raise the issue of the uselessness or danger of a criminal sanction in the
absence of effective legal protection of public officials who blow the whistle. In criminal
law, as in other matters, there is no perfect solution. Nevertheless, attaching a penalty
to failure to report under Article 40, paragraph 2 CPP would at least have the merit of
lifting, once and for all, any ambiguity on the mandatory nature of this provision. It
would  usefully  complement  the  specific  provision  on  protecting  public-sector
whistleblowers, created in Act of 13 July 1983 and modified by the Law of 6 December
2013 on the fight against tax fraud, and would probably provide effective protection
against any retaliation by their superiors.39
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Conclusion
67 Despite recent legislative advances from 2013 to 2016, french law on whistleblowing is
highly fragmented and the implementation of  whistleblower protections presents  a
double difficulty. The first difficulty is that french law is split between the public and
private sectors. The second difficulty comes from the fact that, in each of these sectors,
whistleblowing  mechanisms  relate  to  specific  areas:  discrimination,  sexual  and
psychological harassment, corruption, conflicts of interest, public health, environment,
intelligence, etc. And in each of these sectors, whistleblowing is stymied by other rules,
concepts,  rights and duties provided for in other legislation: employment and data-
protection law, general public service statutes, etc.
68 In the fight against corruption, OECD and GRECO have both recommended that France
take appropriate measures to promote reporting by public officials under Article 40,
paragraph  2  of  the  CPP.  But  France’s  recent  legislative  initiatives  to  reform
whistleblower protection in the French public sector, voted from 2013 to 2016, remain
silent on the procedure for implementing Article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP.
69 However, Sapin 2 which should come into force at the end of 2016 is:
70 - “a unique opportunity for France to join the ranks of the very few European countries which do
have adequate protections for whistleblowers in place such as Ireland and the United Kingdom”,
40and,
71 - “represents a notable and significant step forward in terms of France’s anti-corruption reform
efforts,  although it  remains to be seen whether lawmakers will  find the necessary resolve to
achieve the ambitious goal  that  French Government set  for  the law:  elevating France to  the
highest European and international standards and turning the fight against corruption into a
competitive advantage for economy and business”.41
72 Finally, it appears that the more the French whistleblowing system will be transparent
and effective,  the  more  employees  and  civil  servants  will  be  encouraged  to  report
wrongdoing detected in the performance of their duties.
NOTES
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2. See Article 1161-1 of the Labour Code established by Act No. 2007-1598 of 13 November 2007 -
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and financial crime which added a new article 40, paragraph 6 to the Code of Criminal Procedure
which provides that : “The person who reports an offence or a crime committed in his company
or administrative department shall,  if  he so requests,  be put in touch with the central  anti-
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corruption service [SCPC] when the offence reported falls within its area of competence”. This
provision will be canceled by “Sapin 2” which replaces the SCPC by an “anti-corruption agency”.
7. See article 40, paragraph 1 of the CPP : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
8. See article 40-1 of the CPP : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
9. See article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
10. See OECD Report Phase 3, paragraph 167, p. 63.
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12. See article 226-10 of the French Criminal Code.
13. See OECD Report Phase 3, paragraph 167, p. 63.
14. See OECD Report Phase 3, paragraph 167, p. 64.
15. Ibid.
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administrative  department  shall,  if  he  so  requests,  be  put  in  touch  with  the  central  anti-
corruption service [SCPC] when the offence reported falls within its area of competence”.
22. See  OECD report :  “France :  following up  to  the  Phase  3,  report  and Recommendations”,
paragraph  13,  p. 6,  December  2014 ;  L.  Romanet,  « L’article  40,  alinéa  2  du  CPP,  instrument
juridique pivot de lutte contre la corruption ? », revue du Grasco n° 7, novembre 2013.
23. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), Civil Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 174), Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191), Twenty
Guiding Principles against Corruption (Resolution (97), Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for
Public Officials (Recommendation No. R (2000)10), Recommendation on Common Rules against
Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Recommendation Rec
(2003)4).
24. GRECO’s First Evaluation Round (January 2000) dealt with the independence, specialization
and means available to national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against corruption,
and the extent and scope of immunities. The Second Evaluation Round (January 2003) dealt with
the identification, seizure and confiscation of corruption proceeds ; public administration and
corruption (auditing systems ; conflicts of interest) ; the prevention of legal persons being used
as shields for corruption ; tax and financial legislation to counter corruption ; and links between
corruption, organized crime and money laundering. The Third Evaluation Round (January 2007)
dealt with the incriminations provided for in the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS
173), its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) and Guiding Principle 2 (GPC 2) ; and transparency of Party
Funding with reference to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states
on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns
(Rec (2003)4). The Fourth Evaluation Round (launched in January 2012) dealt with the prevention
of corruption in respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors : http://www.coe.int/
t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/intro_en.asp.
25. See GRECO first evaluation report on France, September 2001, recommendation n° 7, p. 31.
26. See GRECO compliance report on France, October 2003, p. 8, paragraph 34.
27. Ibid.
28. Nevertheless, in 2015, GRECO commented in its Evaluation Report on France (paragraphs 145
and 148)  that :  “French government  tabled  in  2013  a  draft  constitutional  law reforming  the
Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) (no. 815) which aimed at making the appointment of
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prosecutors subject to a favorable opinion from the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM).
There was a political consensus on this point, with both Houses having adopted this measure at
first reading (along with the provision making prosecutors subject to the disciplinary authority
of the CSM). However, this draft law, which contained other less consensual points, did not pass”.
In March 2016, GRECO concluded in its compliance report on France that its recommendation on
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“La  Documentation  française  2016”,  http://www.conseil-etat.fr/content/download/
59086/527939/version/1/file/2016
31. Text No. 4187 adopted by the Senate and sent to the National Assembly on 4 November 2016
for  the  final  reading  of  the  text :  http :  //www.assemblee nationale.fr/14/dossiers/
transparence_lutte_corruption_economie.asp
32. According to leading whistleblower expert, Anna Myers from the Government Accountability
Project  in  Washington  and  co-chair  of  WIN,  an  international  network  of  whistleblowing
organizations : “When whistleblowers disclose information in the public interest, they are doing
us a service. It is up to us to demand the change that is needed and ensure that whistleblowers
are not  held personally  liable  for  their  public  service action”.  Cathy James from the charity
Public Concern at Work in the United Kingdom, says : “It is very important that the law has a
broad coverage, the narrow definitions and preconditions contained within this draft Law will
doubtless  undermine  some  of  the  innovative  provisions  it  contains.” :  http://
blog.transparency.org/2016/06/20/new-whistleblower-protection-law-in-france-not-yet-fit-for-
purpose
33. It must be noted that France remains uncomfortable with the idea of reporting misconduct in
exchange for pecuniary gain. For a comparative study on this subject, see J. Schwartz-Mirallès,
« Les  récompenses  financières  des  lanceurs  d’alerte  portent-elles  atteinte  aux  droits
fondamentaux ? Le cas du droit américain », in « La Revue des droits de l’homme » n° 10, 2016,
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34. J.O n° 0094 of 21 April 2016.
35. See Draft law No. 1252 which proposes to penalize non-compliance of Article 40, paragraph 2
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, made by Pierre Morel-A-Huissier (MP) and registered at the
Presidency  of  the  National  Assembly  on  16  July  2013 :  www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/
propositions/pion1252.asp
36. See Law No. 2013-1117 of 6 December 2013 on action against tax fraud and serious economic
and financial crime which added a new Article 40 paragraph 6 to the Code of Criminal Procedure
which provides that : “The person who reports an offence or a crime committed in his company
or administrative department shall,  if  he so requests,  be put in touch with the central  anti-
corruption service [SCPC] when the offence reported falls within its area of competence”.
37. See article 434-1 of the french Criminal Code.
38. See Reports  of  the  Central  Service  for  Prevention  of  Corruption  (2012,  2013,  2014),  “La
Documentation francaise” : http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr
39. L.  Romanet,  « L’article  40,  alinéa 2 du CPP,  instrument juridique pivot de lutte contre la
corruption ? », revue du GRASCO n° 7, novembre 2013.
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Whistleblowing, which emerged under the influence of US laws and international agreements, is
a  new  concept  for  european  countries.  France  was  initially  reluctant to  establish  effective
whistleblower  protections.  Then,  in  recognition  of  its  international  commitments  and  in
response to various political and financial scandals (Kerviel affair, Cahuzac affair), France adopted
comprehensive reforms of its public and economic life by laws passed from 2007 to 2016. As such,
beyond adopting the legislative changes called for in a number of european and international
conventions, several measures should be considered to improve the legislation on whistleblowing
in  France,  especially  in  the  fight  against  national  and transnational  corruption.  In  the  fight
against  corruption,  OECD and GRECO have both recommended that  France takes appropriate
measures  to  promote  reporting by  public  officials  under  article  40,  paragraph 2  of  the  CPP.
However, France’s recent legislative initiatives to reform whistleblower protection in the french
public  sector,  voted  from  2013  to  2016  (“Sapin  2”),  remain  silent  on  the  procedure  for
implementing article 40, paragraph 2 of the CPP. Clearly, the text of article 40, paragraph 2 of the
CPP,  as  drafted  and  applied  today,  no  longer  meets  France’s  needs  or  its  international
commitments. Legal protection of public officials who blow the whistle during the course of their
duties on corruption matters is not sufficient to ensure the application of article 40, paragraph 2
of  the  CPP.  The  text  should  be  overhauled  in  order  to  provide  a  coherent  and  efficient
mechanism for reporting that protects the rights of french citizens. The scope of this article and
the  conditions  for  its  implementation  should  be  clarified,  and the  question  of  whether  that
provision should be coupled - or not - with a penalty should be discussed.
Le  whistleblowing,  qui  a  émergé  sous  l'influence  des  lois  américaines  et  des  conventions
internationales,  est  un  nouveau  concept  pour  les  pays  européens.  La  France  a  d'abord  été
réticente à introduire une protection juridique des lanceurs d’alerte. Puis, en exécution de ses
engagements internationaux et en réponse à divers scandales de nature politique et financière
(l’affaire  « Kerviel »,  l’affaire  « Cahuzac »),  elle  a  fait  des  réformes  en  ce  sens.  Au-delà  des
modifications  législatives  adoptées  dans  le  prolongement  des  conventions  européennes  et
internationales, plusieurs mesures devraient être envisagées pour améliorer la législation sur ce
point, en particulier dans la lutte contre la corruption nationale et transnationale. Dans leurs
rapports d’évaluation respectifs du dispositif francais de lutte contre la corruption, l'OCDE et le
GRECO  ont  tous  deux  recommandé  que  la  France  prenne  des  mesures  appropriées  pour
permettre une application effective de l'article 40, paragraphe 2 du CPP. Cependant, les récentes
lois françaises qui consacrent la protection des lanceurs d’alerte, notamment les lois votées en
2013 et en 2016 (« Sapin 2 »), demeurent silencieuses sur les modalités d'application de l'article
40, paragraphe 2 du CPP. De toute évidence, le texte de l'article 40, paragraphe 2, du CPP, tel qu'il
est  rédigé  et  appliqué  aujourd'hui,  ne  répond  plus  aux  besoins  et  aux  engagements
internationaux de la France. La protection juridique des agents publics qui signalent des faits
criminels  et  délictuels  constatés  dans  le  cadre  de  leurs  fonctions  ne  suffit  pas  à  garantir
l’application effective de l'article 40, paragraphe 2 du CPP. Ce dispositif devrait faire l’objet de
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lignes directrices claires au sein de chaque administration concernée. Son champ d'application et
les  conditions  de  sa  mise  en œuvre  devraient  être  précisés  et  la  question de  savoir  si  cette
disposition doit être assortie d’une sanction - ou pas -, enfin traitée par les pouvoirs publics.
INDEX
Keywords: whistleblower, fight against corruption, OECD convention on combating bribery of
foreign public officials in international business transactions, european legislation on the fight
against corruption, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), french reforms, Sapin II,
article 40 of the french code of criminal procedure, public official, prosecutor.
Mots-clés: lanceur d'alerte, lutte contre la corruption, convention de l'OCDE sur la lutte contre
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